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Abstract 
Political staffers are an increasingly relevant area of study due to dropping party membership rates, 
increasing staff size and the growing prominence of staff positions in political careers. However, the 
subject is understudied and remains limited to studies of staff size and the role of staffers within specific 
institutions. This paper introduces a research proposal that aims to join earlier in depth studies of 
political staff by conducting the first survey among staffers of all Dutch and Belgian parties represented 
in parliament. Based on these empirical data, we will investigate their recruitment, socio-demographic 
composition, political opinions, expertise, professional ambition and democratic accountability. The 
project will be constructed around five separate papers, in which the position of staffers within parties 
will be discussed through the lens of existing theoretical work on party politics. By gathering new 
empirical data on the subject, our goal is to connect the discussion on political staff with larger 
questions on party organization, such as electoral-professionalism, the opinion structure of parties, 
cartelization and democratic accountability.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Paid staff members are omnipresent in today’s political parties and institutions. Following the historical 
development of party organizations, they have become involved in important aspects of the political 
process. The first political employees to catch the attention of political scientists were involved in 
extra-parliamentary party organizations, “running the party machine” (Michels, 1915). Up until today, 
staffers oversee membership administration and coordinate between central offices and local 
branches. Second, parties and elected officials have enlisted staff to support their activities inside 
public institutions. In legislative bodies, they assist MP’s in drafting legislation and controlling the 
executive branch of government. In their turn, ministers are accompanied by advisors with policy 
expertise within their respective portfolios. Third, the most infamous staffers are campaign strategists 
who advise parties and candidates on how to communicate and appeal to voters. The permanent 
campaign environment (Blumenthal, 1980) has led parties to hire social media managers and 
opposition researchers outside of election periods. Hence, political staff have a significant role in party 
organization, policy-making and communication.  
Although research on political staff is scarce (Webb & Kolodny, 2006), it is nonetheless a relevant area 
for empirical research. First, they hold a peculiar position as non-elected elites. Unlike other political 
elites that are often studied, staffers are involved in the political process without being elected. 
However, they often operate behind the scenes, an area that remains opaque to voters and the public 
at large. Yet in contrast to civil servants, their position as political appointee is inherently partisan and 
should be of interest to political scientists. Second, a considerable portion of political staff pursue 
elected office later on. Future MP’s and ministers increasingly gain experience through paid political 
work (Barber, 2014; Cowley, 2012). In such cases, unelected staff positions serve as a training ground 
for future elected officials, providing a novel, non-traditional pathway to power (Taflaga & Kerby, 
2017). Third, political parties have become more dependent on paid labor due to the continuing 
decline of party membership figures (Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012). While party members could 
initially serve as volunteers supporting the party organization, these diminishing free labor forces were 
replaced by paid employees. As a consequence, the role of paid staff is becoming increasingly 
important as political parties professionalize (Krouwel, 2012; Webb & Fisher, 2003; Webb & Keith, 
2017).  
Most existing studies have investigated this increasing professionalization by analyzing evolutions in 
staff size. Longitudinal analyses of European party organizations have documented a significant 
increase in staff size since the 1960’s (Farrell & Webb, 2002; Kölln, 2015; Krouwel, 2012). From this 
long term perspective, the theoretical imperative of ongoing linear growth is supported by virtually 
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every case within the analysis. As expected, staff growth has especially occurred within the public face 
of parties (Bardi, Calossi, & Pizzimenti, 2017; Katz & Mair, 1993). However, there are more aspects to 
the professionalization of parties than increasing staff size. As described by Panebianco (1988), the 
process entails a shift in the individual profile of staff members: a transition from bureaucrats towards 
professionals with higher levels of expertise. Although studies of staff size do indicate that party 
organizations have indeed been transformed, our knowledge about this growing body of staff remains 
very limited. This research proposal aims to fill that gap with a cross-sectional, in depth investigation 
of political staff. Who are they and what they do? 
This research project aims to produce a better understanding of the position of paid staffers within 
party organizations. More specifically, the investigation will focus on the career development of 
staffers, investigate the impact of staff on the internal power balance of parties and assess the 
democratic accountability of political advisors. Empirical data will be gathered through an online 
survey among political staffers from all parliamentary represented Belgian and Dutch parties (see: 
appendix). As a complement to these quantitative data, semi-structured elite interviews will be carried 
out for additional insights on more sensitive and complex issues. Hence, the anticipated result is a 
cross-sectional study among fifteen parties from two different nations. The project will be constructed 
around five separate papers, each dealing with a specific aspect of the relationship between political 
parties and their staff (Table 1). As a common thread, all papers will aim to explain variation between 
staffers on four analytical levels, examining factors related to differences between 1) individuals, 2) 
party branches, 3) party organizations and 4) nations.  
Paper Title        Topic Empirical indicators 
1. Professionalization versus pillarization? 
Political ties and staff recruitment. 
Recruitment 
criteria 
Party ties 
Societal ties 
2. Between grassroots and elites? Assessing 
congruence between staff and other party actors.  
Intra-party 
congruence 
Sociodemographic 
profile 
Ideological position 
3. From knowledge to power. The distribution of 
staff expertise in party organizations. 
Distribution of 
expertise 
Level of expertise 
4. Should I stay or should I go? The professional 
ambitions of political staffers.  
Direction of 
ambition 
Career aspirations 
5. Of masters and puppets. The control 
mechanisms between staff and elected elites.  
Democratic 
accountability 
Control mechanisms 
Table 1: Research Project divided into five papers 
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Concerning career development, our analysis will deal with how staffers enter and exit their position 
within party organizations. While our first paper will investigate the importance of political ties during 
recruitment, the exit of staff will later on be analyzed in paper four. Which career paths do staffers 
envision after their current position? Furthermore, their impact on the intra-party balance will be 
approached from a vertical and a horizontal perspective. In paper two, we will investigate the vertical 
perspective by comparing their political opinions and sociodemographic profile to the party grassroots. 
The horizontal perspective will be addressed in paper three, in which we will focus on the distribution 
of expertise among different party branches. Does the level of expertise among staff members reflect 
the ascendancy of the party in public office? Finally, our fifth and last paper will focus on the interaction 
between staffers and elected elites within institutions and party organizations. By analyzing the 
democratic control mechanisms that hold staffers accountable, the research project will conclude by 
examining if and when the position of political staff constitutes a democratic deficit in representative 
democracies.   
The contribution of this research project to existing literature will be threefold. First, the research 
project will elaborate the peculiar position of political staff within party democracy by addressing their 
significance within intra-party democracy and public institutions. In doing so, it aims to address an 
issue that has only briefly been touched upon by earlier studies (Fisher & Webb, 2003; Karlsen & Saglie, 
2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003). Second, we build on the studies by Webb & Fisher (2003) and Karlsen & 
Saglie (2017) by including staff from all faces of the party (Katz & Mair, 1993). Most studies on 
individual staff explore the role of employees within a specific institution, either within the legislative 
(Busby & Belkacem, 2013; Egeberg, Gornitzka, Trondal, & Johannessen, 2013; Pegan, 2017; Romzek & 
Utter, 1997) or executive branch of government (Dickinson & Tenpas, 2002; Maley, 2000; Walgrave, 
Caals, Suetens, & De Swert, 2004). The proposed research design will investigate all faces within party 
organizations, which enables us to study how the profiles and task assignments of staffers might differ 
between different party branches. Third, our case-selection strategy allows for explanatory analyses 
of individual differences between staffers. By including both Belgian and Dutch parties, our data will 
allow for comparison across different political systems and party families. Previous surveys of political 
staff were either limited to a certain party (Webb & Fisher, 2003) or focused on a specific political 
system (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section two, a discussion of our understanding of political staffers 
will delineate our population of interest. The research design will be introduced in section three by 
addressing five separate papers, each one centered around research question. In section four, our 
strategy to disseminate a survey among this nonelected elite will be discussed. Finally, section five will 
5 
 
propose a research schedule, putting a time frame on the different work packages for the research 
project.   
2. Defining political staff: delineating the population 
 
As this research proposal explicitly targets political staff, it aims to explore a specific population. In this 
section, we draw clear boundaries to sharpen our understanding of the study object. More specifically, 
we choose to investigate political agents with a remunerated, unelected position that have been 
politically appointed within a party organization or political institution. We consider each of these 
individual properties (criteria) as necessary conditions for belonging to our population of interest.  In 
the following paragraphs, these four relevant criteria are discussed in more detail. While each criterion 
will be situated within existing literature on staff and party organization, we will also pinpoint which 
specific political agents are excluded by wielding these criteria.   
Criterion Exclusion 
Remuneration Volunteers 
Unelected position Elected officials 
Political appointment Civil servants 
Inside organization/institution Independent consultants 
Table 2: Criteria for delineating political staff 
 
Our first criterion concerns the issue of remuneration: staff members receive a salary in return for their 
political activities. In this sense, they “live off politics” as described by Weber 1921) in his discussion of 
politics as a vocation. Applying this criterion makes an essential distinction between staff and 
volunteers like party members or sympathizers. The distinction between voluntary and paid political 
work is often interpreted as a historical transition from labor-intensive to capital-intensive forms of 
party organization (Farrell & Webb, 2002). Whereas voluntary party activists played a vital role within 
labor-intensive organizations, capital-intensive party organizations increasingly rely on paid staff 
instead. Although voluntary agents certainly continue to be relevant to the political process, our 
interest lies with the individuals who are directly employed within party organizations or political 
institutions. Hence, the origin of their salary can either be the party payroll or the state (Monroe, 2001; 
Webb & Kolodny, 2006).    
Secondly, our notion of staffers is confined to unelected positions. As opposed to elected officials, 
staffers are hired and appointed by party organizations or political leaders. While both staff and 
elected officials are considered to be a part of a political class that lives off politics (Borchert, 2003; 
Von Beyme, 1996), the election of political leaders by voters or party members sets them apart from 
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their advisors and aides. In fact, the peculiar position of staff as an unelected elite raises interesting 
questions in and of itself. While some have stressed their recruitment among grass roots activists as a 
sign of their similarity to party members (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017), others have demonstrated that their 
profiles and attitudes show more correspondence to elected elites (Fisher & Webb, 2003; Webb & 
Fisher, 2003). Furthermore, individuals can move between elected and non-elected political positions, 
which is clearly demonstrated by the growing number of elected officials with prior experience as 
political advisors (Allen, 2012; Barber, 2014).  
Thirdly, the research project will be limited to formal politically appointed positions. Although civil 
service can be subject to party patronage (Kopecký, Mair, & Spirova, 2012; Peters & Pierre, 2004), the 
politicization of public administration goes beyond the scope of this research project. Hence, the 
investigation will focus on staffers in positions that have deliberately been created for political 
appointments. We acknowledge that staff and civil servants don not inhabit completely separate 
worlds: a considerable portion of political staff might have earlier professional experience or future 
ambitions as a civil servant (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). In the Belgian case, ministerial cabinet members 
have even been known to hop back and forth between public administration and ministerial cabinets 
(De Winter & Dumont, 2006). However, expanding our analysis to the civil service would make the 
group of respondents too large and heterogeneous. Therefore, we exclude civil service personnel that 
remains in position regardless of changes in the composition of political leadership within institutions.  
Lastly, we will focus our attention solely on staff working within political organizations and institutions. 
This excludes the independent, external consultants who are often hired as strategists for electoral 
campaigns (Dulio, 2006; Farrell, Kolodny, & Medvic, 2001; Scammell, 1998). As pointed out by Karlsen 
2010), the direct political involvement of such external consultants has been somewhat overestimated 
in European political systems due to their prevalence in American, candidate-centered politics. As a 
result, research on political staff has been distorted by a sociological ideal type political professional 
with a high level of independence and self-regulation, similar to doctors or lawyers. However, the 
European party-centered context offers a different picture. The process of cartelization (Katz & Mair, 
1995) has created a vast reservoir of public resources for parties to accumulate internal expertise in 
support of their elected elites. The proposed research project will be limited to those internal experts, 
omitting the role of external consultants.  
3. Research design 
Staff are a crucial component of today’s party organizations due to the process of professionalization. 
In his seminal contribution to the topic, Panebianco (1988) considered the growing presence of staff 
professionals as “the distinguishing feature of the organizational change political parties are currently 
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undergoing” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 231). The changing composition of political staff signaled a switch 
from mass bureaucratic to electoral-professional parties. Reinforced by the abundance of public 
resources, this process of professionalization exemplifies a fundamental shift towards capital-intensive 
forms of organization (Farrell & Webb, 2002). Whereas voluntary party activists played a vital role in 
the era of mass membership politics, parties increasingly rely on paid professionals instead. Fueled by 
cartelized party-state linkages (Van Biezen & Kopecký, 2014), this organizational shift embodies the 
widening gap between political parties and society at large. Furthermore, the infusion of staff into 
politics has transformed party organizations from within. As the influx of staff is distributed unequally 
within political organizations, some party branches thrive while others are becoming increasingly 
marginalized. The growth of staff has particularly benefitted public and central offices to the detriment 
of the crisis-struck party on the ground (Katz & Mair, 1993, 2003).  
However, the impact of professionalization goes well beyond simply employing more staff. Instead 
attracting additional traditional bureaucrats, parties have increasingly shifted their interest towards 
different types of staff (Panebianco, 1988). The demand for this different kind of staffer can be 
considered as a response to several environmental challenges. In relation to voters, parties face 
increased competition due to electoral volatility. As parties broadened their electoral focus beyond 
their classe gardéé (Kirchheimer, 1966), the emergence of mass media offered platforms for direct 
linkage with voters. As a result, parties now hire trained professionals to navigate technological 
developments and strengthen their position towards media outlets. Among members and activists, 
parties face the weakening of the party on the ground (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). As membership 
bases shrunk during the last decades, the available pool of voluntary human capital became 
increasingly limited. Hence, parties rely on staff to support and stimulate local activists, candidates and 
mandate-holders. In the policy arena, parties require expertise on a diverse set of issues. As the 
societal reach of current-day welfare states covers a broad range of policy domains and multi-level 
governance gains importance, parties need staff who can navigate the complex and technical nature 
of policy-making.  
This research project aims to join earlier in depth studies of political staff (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb 
& Fisher, 2003) by addressing the role of Belgian and Dutch political staffers within party organizations 
in five separate papers. In each paper, our data about the employees will be connected to a larger 
theoretical question. First, a paper will investigate on the role of staff recruitment in party 
organizations. By mapping their prior and current participation levels and their earlier professional 
experience, the analysis will address how parties value ideological affinity and activism. The larger 
theoretical discussion will focus on the impact of pillarization (Lijphart, 1968) on staffing patterns. 
Second, a paper will address the role of staff towards other party actors. By comparing the 
8 
 
sociodemographic composition and the political opinions, the paper will discuss whether staff 
empower political elites to the disadvantage of grassroots activists. The discussion will be embedded 
in theoretical insights about May’s special law of curvilinear disparity (May, 1973) and cartelization 
(Katz & Mair, 1993, 1995).  
Third, a paper will focus on the role of staff in the distribution of expertise within party organizations. 
The analysis will measure the individual expertise of political staff and compare the distribution of this 
expertise between the party on the ground (subnational branches), the party in central office and the 
party in public office. The theoretical backbone will be founded on the ascendancy of the party in public 
office (Katz & Mair, 2003), in combination with the systemic impact of partitocracy and fractiocracy. 
Fourth, a paper will explore the role of staff careerism in party organizations. It will investigate which 
factors can explain the different types of ambition (discrete, static, progressive) and different 
professional directions (public office, party work, private sector, …) envisaged by political staffers. 
Supporting theory will originate from existing insights on political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966). Fifth, 
the last paper will address the role of staff in representative democracy. By examining the democratic 
chains of delegation and control, the analysis will investigate the interaction between elected elites 
and their unelected staff. The theoretical foundation for this topic will come from a principal-agent 
approach to the democratic chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000).  
In what follows, the approach of each paper will be further elaborated in five sections. Each section 
develops a research question with corresponding expectations linked to a larger theoretical 
framework. Regarding this theoretical angle, we deliberately chose to expand the theoretical horizon 
of the papers beyond the literature on political professionalization. Instead of considering the level of 
professionalism a purpose in and of itself, this proposal discusses specific aspects of professionalism 
(expertise, autonomy, career mobility, commitment) within a broader frame of reference. Although 
earlier studies have used a direct approach to professionalism (Romzek & Utter, 1997; Webb & Fisher, 
2003), the fundamental aim of this project is to enhance our understanding of the role of staffers in 
political parties. Moreover, such an approach demonstrates the broader relevance of the research 
topic. Instead of studying political staff for the sake of it, this research proposal addresses their 
significance within party democracy. 
3.1. Professionalization versus pillarization? Political ties and staff recruitment.  
Existing literature on professionalization argues that the political ties between parties and their staff 
have weakened (Panebianco, 1988; Webb & Fisher, 2003). Compared to bureaucrats, professional staff 
are assumed to have weaker ties to party organizations. As described in the seminal work by Michels 
(1915), “the bureaucrat identifies himself completely with the organization, confounding his own 
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interests with its interests” (1915, p. 138). In contrast, political professionals have less need for such 
“traditional identity incentives” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 232). Hence, Scammel 1998) refers to political 
professionalization as a process of displacement. “Party strategists have been replaced by non-party 
‘professional’ strategists” (Scammell, 1998, p. 4). This emphasis on the political links of staff dates back 
to the conceptual foundations of political professionalization, which was based on the sociological 
ideal type of professionalism (exemplified by medical doctors or lawyers). However, this interpretation 
of staff is largely inspired by the American, candidate-centered context with weak party organizations 
and an industry of independent political consulting. As a result, the existing frame of reference has 
limited applicability to political staff in European, party-centered systems (Farrell & Webb, 2002; 
Karlsen, 2010).  
Empirical research of European cases has contradicted this dominant image of political staff. Evidence 
from the United Kingdom and Norway indicates significant ties between political parties and their 
staffers (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003). In both cases, the vast majority of party staff 
were active members within the party organization before their employment. This observation has 
lead Karlsen & Saglie 2017) to conclude that European professional staffers resemble unelected party 
politicians more than the theoretical image of strategy professionals. Interestingly, Norwegian staff 
with more professional profiles even have stronger ties to the party compared to other staffers. 
 Technical tasks Strategic tasks 
Strong party ties Party bureaucrat Unelected party politician 
Weak party ties Technical assistent Strategy professional 
Table 3: Typology of Party Staff (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017, p. 5) 
This research proposal aims to introduce new data from the Low countries and advance the discussion 
by introducing additional elements. The first paper will therefore investigate the following research 
question: How strong are the political ties between staff and political parties in the Low countries 
(RQ1)? By measuring the degree of membership and activism before and during employment, the 
paper will discuss how our cases relate to existing theory and earlier empirical studies. We expect that 
party ties might be stronger than in other European cases due to the historical context of pillarization 
in the low countries (Lijphart, 1968). As traditional political movements structured civil society via 
extensive networks of collateral organizations, we anticipate that staff recruitment is likely to be 
facilitated by these organizational networks. In addition to structural coordination mechanisms, 
exchange of personnel might help to maintain ideological coherence within these pillars.  
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In addition to these aggregate observations of party ties among political staff, this paper will take the 
discussion a step further by investigating the conditions that shape the strength of party ties. After 
constructing a party ties index, it will assess to what extent different factors can explain individual 
variation in the strength of party ties. Such an explanatory approach will enable us to contribute to this 
ongoing discussion by developing and testing new hypotheses about the party ties of staffers. From an 
individual perspective, we anticipate that staff with political tasks involving communication, policy or 
organization will have stronger party ties than their colleagues involved in administrative and technical 
tasks. Although the theoretical image of staffers predicts that more professional tasks might correlate 
with weak party ties, earlier studies of staffers party-centered political systems have observed the 
opposite effect (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). From the perspective of party families, it is expected that staff 
working for parties belonging to traditional pillars will have stronger party ties. In contrast, 
nontraditional parties in search for staff have to recruit more personnel outside of such existing 
networks. From a systemic perspective, we anticipate that the high level of party patronage in Belgium 
(Kopecký et al., 2012; Müller, 2006) corresponds to stronger ties between parties and staff. Moreover, 
the systemic contrast between Belgian partitocracy (De Winter, 1996) and Dutch fractiocracy 
(Andeweg, 2000) will have an impact on the strength of party ties among staff in the public and central 
office. We expect the most influential branches of the party to concentrate staffers with the strongest 
party ties. This hypothesis predicts strong ties in Belgian central offices and ministerial cabinets, as 
opposed to strong political ties in the parliamentary party in the Dutch case.  
3.2.  Between grassroots and elites?  Assessing congruence between staff and other party 
actors.  
Scholars of party politics consider the party on the ground as the weakest link in contemporary party 
organizations (Scarrow, Webb, & Farrell, 2000; Van Biezen et al., 2012). Since it strengthens the 
position of elites, staff growth is assumed to contribute to this marginalization of the party on the 
ground (Katz & Mair, 2003). As these developments coincided with a de-energization among local 
volunteers (Seyd & Whiteley, 2002), elected elites have expanded their influence within parties to the 
disadvantage of grassroots activists. A similar evolution characterizes the interaction between political 
elites and the public at large. Fueled by a dissatisfaction with the political establishment, elected elites 
are portrayed as a self-involved political class (Allen & Cairney, 2017). Being out of touch with the 
public, political elites are considered to inhabit an ivory tower. In our second paper, we aim to 
investigate if  and how this supposed divide applies to staffers. Is there a gap between staff and the 
party on the ground (members and voters)? Do they contribute to this division between elites and the 
public, or can they act as mediators instead?  
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Existing research on staff has considered both sides of the argument. While some have argued that the 
recruitment of staff among activists (cf. party ties) may prevent staffers from becoming ‘uncritical yea-
sayers’ (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017), others have stressed the sociodemographic similarities between staff 
and elected elites (Webb & Fisher, 2003). To investigate this supposed gap between members and 
staffers, this research project will compare party strata on two fronts: their sociodemographic 
composition and their ideological positions. Hence, the second paper will address the following 
research question: How do the social-demographic characteristics and ideological positions of staff 
compare to party members, party voters and elected elites (RQ2)?  To answer this question, our 
primary data-collection among political staff will be matched to secondary data from existing projects. 
Depending on the reference group, these data could stem from projects such as MAPP (party 
members), European social survey (voters) or Partirep (MP’s). 
First, the analysis will address this issue from the angle of ‘political sociology’ (Webb & Kolodny, 2006) 
through a discussion of sociodemographic characteristics. More specifically, the age, education, 
economic status, gender and ethnicity of staffers will be compared to other groups. The politics of 
presence (Phillips, 1995) provide the underlying logic for this comparison. The assumption is that, for 
the interests of certain groups and minorities to be represented, the sociodemographic composition 
of political staff should resemble (at least to some extent) members and voters. Based on similar 
approaches, earlier studies have observed an underrepresentation of women (Taflaga & Kerby, 2017) 
and less-educated working class (Webb & Fisher, 2003). Our expectations are in accordance with those 
earlier studies. We expect that the gender balance, social status and ethnic background among staff 
will not be representative of voters and (to a lesser extent) members, especially when we single out 
the actual political staffers by filtering out administrative and technical positions. In accordance with 
the glass ceiling phenomenon, we expect underrepresentation to be stronger in prestigious staff 
positions (high ranking functions within the public office). 
Second, this paper aims to add a new element to this discussion: the political attitudes of staffers. Our 
analysis of their sociodemographic profile is likely to show that they are indeed different from 
members and voters. However, the question remains: do they actually think differently? Does the 
anticipated descriptive underrepresentation among staffers translate into substantive 
underrepresentation? Instead of inferring ideological divides from social characteristics, this research 
project aims to directly investigate the opinion structure among staffers, members, voters and elected 
elites. More specifically, the paper will contrast the positions of the different party strata on a left-right 
scale and a broader set of ideological indicators1. We anticipate that such an approach will offer us a 
                                                          
1 The actual content of these indicators will have to be coordinated between our primary data-gathering and the 
availability of specific information in the secondary datasets needed for the analysis. Additional indicators could 
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more nuanced view on the relationship between different party actors. In contrast to May’s infamous 
law on curvilinear disparity (May, 1973), empirical research has indicated that ideological 
disagreements within parties do not align with divisions between different party strata (Holsteyn, 
Ridder, & Koole, 2017; Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995). As a result, staffers or elites might just as well as 
members be found on different sides of an ideological divide.  
3.3. From knowledge to power. The distribution of staff expertise in party organizations.  
The impact of organization on the intra-party power balance is a recurrent theme in research on party 
politics. From the functioning of extra-parliamentary organizations (Duverger, 1964; Michels, 1915) to 
the professionalization of electoral strategies (Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988), political 
scientists have investigated how the organization of parties (dis)empowers certain political agents or 
institutions. More recently, Katz & Mair 2003) have argued that the public face of political parties has 
gained unprecedented importance at the expense of other party faces. The ascendancy of the party in 
public office is considered an integral part of the process of cartelization, in which parties have become 
closely intertwined with the state (Katz & Mair, 1995). The underlying logic is that these public 
institutions are the main recipient of the abundance in public resources, reflected in superior funding 
and staffing (Katz & Mair, 1993, 1995, 2003). Hence, the increasing amount of staffers in public offices 
is considered to strengthen the concentration of power with the political leaders within these offices, 
reinforcing presidentialization (Poguntke & Webb, 2007). 
In accordance with the observations of Katz & Mair 1993), several consecutive studies of staff size have 
unanimously demonstrated that the biggest staff growth has occurred within the public face of parties 
(Bardi et al., 2017; Katz & Mair, 1993; Krouwel, 2012). However, other studies have noted that a larger 
staff does not automatically imply a greater ability to exercise leadership (Elgie, 1995; King, 1993). In 
order to assess whether public offices actually have such a staffing advantage, we argue that the 
expertise of staffers is a more appropriate indicator. Hence, our third paper will investigate the 
following research question: How is staff expertise distributed between the party on the ground, the 
central office, the party in parliament and the party in government (RQ3)? More specifically, the link 
between individual expertise and the physical work location of staffers will be analyzed to test the 
assumption of the ascendancy of the party in public office. Hence, the key hypothesis is that most 
staffers with high levels of expertise will be concentrated within the public face of the party, in contrast 
to central offices and (most significantly) the party on the ground (Katz & Mair, 1993). To test our 
general hypothesis, the analysis will examine the tasks of staffers and determine their level of 
                                                          
include measurements of materialism/post materialism, ethnocentrism, authoritarianism or positions on specific 
political issues.  
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expertise. First, the activities carried out by staff in different party branches will be addressed. Based 
the typology of tasks conceived by Karlsen & Saglie  2017), the main assignment of staffers will be 
categorized as either political-strategic (communication, policy or organization) or administrative 
(accounting, IT, administrative support or personnel management). Second, an index measuring the 
individual expertise of each respondent will be constructed by combining the indicators that measure 
their level of education and prior professional experience.  
In addition to testing this general hypothesis, the proposed case-selection will enable us to analyze 
how the differences between party faces are shaped by systemic and party-specific conditions. From 
a systemic perspective, this third paper will contrast the Belgian partitocratic setting (De Winter & 
Dumont, 2006; Deschouwer, 2012) with the Dutch institutional context of fractiocracy (Andeweg, 
2000). Such a comparison is driven by the hypothesis that expertise is more equally distributed 
between central and public offices in Belgian parties, while the parliamentary party and small executive 
staffs act as the uncontested centers of expertise in the Netherlands. Hence, our study will argue that 
a more fine-grained distinction between the party in government and the party in parliament is needed 
to capture the nuances of the ascendancy of the party in public office. From a party-specific 
perspective, we aim to investigate the relation between staff infrastructure and the age, ideology and 
electoral strength of political parties observed in Moens & Smulders 2017). As the forementionned 
paper demonstrated that older, left-oriented and electorally strong parties employ the largest 
amounts of staff, we will investigate how staffing patterns on the aggregate level relate to the 
individual characteristics of staffers. Does a large staff infrastructure correspond to a higher degree of 
expertise? Or do parties with a limited amount of staff compensate their quantitative disadvantage 
with higher levels of individual expertise?  
3.4. Should I stay or should I go? The professional ambitions of political staffers.  
Compared to other occupations, political staffers are involved in a particularly dynamic professional 
environment. Driven by political developments and electoral cycles, their positions are neither 
permanent nor static. Not surprisingly, different studies have observed high turnover rates in political 
offices (Dickinson & Tenpas, 2002; Salisbury & Shepsle, 1981; Webb & Fisher, 2003). In a fourth paper, 
we aim to investigate these career developments by linking the earlier professional experience of 
staffers (cf. 3.1.) to their future career plans. More specifically, the paper will address the different 
directions of these professional aspirations (elected office, party work, private sector, public sector, …) 
and investigate how variation between individual staffers can be explained. Such an analysis will 
contribute to a better understanding of the factors that drive the behavior of staff. Moreover, we argue 
14 
 
that career patterns affect their relationship with elected elites – a  topic that will be discussed in more 
detail in our fifth and final paper.  
Theoretical party literature offers competing views on the career patterns of political professionals. 
On the one hand, Panebianco (1988) claims that political professionals will either abandon politics for 
more prestigious occupations or try to gain an elected position. On the other hand, Katz & Mair (2009) 
speak of increasing specialization, resulting in a growing separation with other occupational tracks. To 
test how these hypotheses apply to our respondents, the proposed analysis aims to describe and 
explain the different career aspirations of staffers. Hence, our fourth paper will investigate the 
following research question: What are different the career patterns of political staffers and how can 
they be explained by individual characteristics (RQ4)? In the descriptive section of our analysis, the 
paper will first distinguish between internal and external career paths and explore the different 
avenues for future careers (political work, elected office, public sector and private sector). 
Consequently, the career aspirations of staffers that aim to stay within the political environment will 
be compared to the current positions of respondents to classify their political ambitions according to 
the work of Schlesinger (1966). Hence, the career plans of respondents will either be static (remain at 
current level) or progressive (move to a more prestigious level).   
In the second section of this paper, we will investigate which factors can explain staffers’ different 
career plans. Why do some plan to stay while others leave? Why do some aspire elected office while 
others do not? Why do some have progressive ambitions while others anticipate a static career? Our 
independent variables will be based on the earlier analyses described above. We anticipate that 
individual differences in party ties, expertise, tasks and sociodemographic characteristics will have a 
meaningful influence on the future plans of staffers. First, one can expect that stronger party ties will 
lead to the aspiration to stay with the party or pursue elected office. Second, we anticipate that higher 
levels of expertise will lead to progressive ambitions and will incentivize staffers to leave politics in 
search of a more prestigious position or higher remuneration. Third, bureaucratic tasks like 
administration are expected to lead to static ambitions, with respondents aspiring to remain in politics 
within their current position. Fourth, similar modest ambitions are likely to be more common among 
underrepresented minorities. Fifth, the electoral and governing prospects of parties might influence 
ambition, as entering or leaving a government coalition can open or close a window of opportunity for 
staffers with certain ambitions.  
3.5.  Of masters and puppets. The control mechanisms between staff and elected elites.  
Although legislative studies often approach representative democracy as a chain of delegation (Strøm 
& Müller, 2009), these insights are rarely applied to party organizations as such. However, we argue 
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that this principal-agent framework can enhance our understanding of the relationship between staff 
and elected elites in contemporary parliamentary democracies. By applying this perspective, elected 
elites in central and public offices can be seen as the principals who delegate a number of tasks to 
staffers (agents). The relationship between these two political actors represents one step in a larger 
process, namely the democratic chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000). In the case of parliamentary 
assistants for example, voters transfer political authority to representatives who, in their turn, delegate 
aspects of their assignment to staffers. To ensure that the interests of voters, MP’s and staffers remain 
aligned, “this chain of delegation is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the 
reverse direction” (Strøm, 2000). For other types of staffers, these chains can either run through extra-
parliamentary party structures or the executive branch of government. Table four offers a simplified 
reconstruction of such chains of delegation and accountability.   
Chain of delegation Chain of accountability 
Voters > MP’s > Legislative staff Legislative staff > MP’s > Voters 
Voters > MP’s > Prime Minister > Minister > Executive staff Executive staff > Minister > Prime Minister > MP’s > Voters 
Party members > Party leader > Party staff Party staff > Party leader > Party members 
Table 4: Democratic chain of representation applied to Political staff 
However, this theoretical framework does not necessarily reflect the political realities of staffers in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. It rather offers a normative approach of how democratic accountability 
should be organized, based on the principles of representative democracy. Instead of simply taking the 
structure of these chains as a given, this paper aims to contrast theory and practice of the control 
mechanisms between elected elites (principal) and staffers (agent). We argue that the relationship 
between these two political actors is important for two reasons. First, it addresses the potential 
democratic deficit caused by having a nonelected elite directly involved in political work. As discussed 
by Karlsen & Saglie (2017), the unelected position of staffers is less problematic in democratic terms if 
they “are accountable to someone who is accountable to the electorate, the party organisation, or 
both” (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). From a democratic viewpoint, the interaction along this chain of 
accountability matters a lot more than the mere existence of nonelected political actors. Second, the 
relationship between elected elites and staffers has implications for the power balance between the 
political leaders of different party branches. More specifically, extra-parliamentary party organizations 
are known for intervening in this democratic chain of delegation. Previous studies have analyzed how 
parties extract resources from parliamentary institutions, ranging from personal assistants (Pegan, 
2017) to party group experts (De Winter & Dumont, 2006). Hence, this final paper will address a 
fundamental question: the potential tension between political professionalization and democracy. 
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Since this tension lingers in the background of most studies of political staff, this study aims to foster 
an informed debate with empirical evidence. 
Our fifth paper will investigate this relationship between elected elites and staffers through the 
following research question: Which elected leaders act as the principals of staffers and through which 
control mechanisms do they hold staffers accountable (RQ5)? The analysis will investigate two types 
of control mechanisms and address how they can be used to hold staff accountable. On the one hand, 
elected elites control staff via ex-ante mechanisms such as hiring procedures, in which the principal 
directs the actions of agents before delegation takes place (Lupia, 2003). On the other hand, ex-post 
mechanisms such as monitoring and oversight enable elected elites to control staffers after the fact. 
At this point, we have identified six potential instruments that political elites can use to direct the 
behavior of staffers (Table 5). Most likely, this list will be further adjusted as we explore the topic 
empirically.  
Ex-ante Ex-post 
Recruitment and selection Day-to-day interaction 
Contractual agreements Remuneration, financial incentives 
Codes of conduct, directives Fulfilment of career ambitions 
Table 5: Staff control mechanisms 
In describing the use of these different control mechanisms, the analysis will combine qualitative and 
quantitative observations. Due to the complex (and possibly sensitive) nature of the subject, we argue 
that qualitative data-gathering is the most appropriate strategy in this case. However, our survey 
questionnaire will contain a few questions to support this fifth paper. More specifically, the survey will 
gather data about selection procedures and personal interaction. This information will give us a first 
impression of the complexity of screening procedures and the actors involved in it, as well as illustrate 
the monitoring of staffers by colleagues and elected officials. Together with our earlier observations 
about the recruitment (3.1.) and ambitions (3.4.) of staffers, this quantitative material will provide a 
firm frame of for reference for a more qualitative, in-depth approach. This research design will enable 
us to a) describe existing practices and b) contrast our empirical observations with the principles of 
democratic accountability.  
We expect that the analysis will illustrate two significant phenomena: power concentration and 
individual variation between staffers. First, we anticipate that the existing chains of delegation will lead 
to a small group of elected officials in top positions, consisting of the party leadership and members of 
the executive. Moreover, we expect this small elite to delegate the management of staffers to their 
senior staff, de facto surpassing other elected elites. According to existing literature about parties in 
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the Low countries, we can expect this concentration to strengthen Belgian extra-parliamentary 
leaderships (De Winter & Dumont, 2006), while empowering parliamentary leaders in the Dutch case 
(Andeweg, 2000). Second, we foresee that the strength of existing control mechanisms is dependent 
on the type of staffers who are involved. For example, the ex-ante control of staffers without 
meaningful party ties could be considerably weaker. The risk of ideological incongruence is higher, 
since such staffers did not invest in the parties’ political project before their employment. Conversely, 
the ex-post control of staffers with static or progressive ambitions in politics could be considerably 
stronger. With party leaderships being ‘in control of the means to their ambitions’ (Strøm & Müller, 
2009), these staffers will be considerably more sensitive to career incentives than their counterparts 
with ambitions outside of politics. Finally, staffers with a high level of expertise will also be harder to 
control, as information asymmetry can strengthen agents towards their principals (Lupia, 2003).  
4. Data and method 
As the research project is built on a mixed-method design, our papers will rely on a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data. In this section, the chosen methods are discussed in more detail. 
First, we explain how our in depth interviews will be carried out in two separate phases: an exploratory 
and a targeted phase. Thereafter, the specificities of the proposed survey design will be addressed, as 
we identify two important issues that need extra attention: gaining access and improving response 
rates.  
4.1. Qualitative data 
Although most of the proposed papers will be based on data gathered through a survey, this research 
project will nonetheless gather crucial information through semi-structured in depth interviews with 
staffers and (to a lesser extent) elected elites. Not only will these interviews introduce us to a relatively 
opaque environment, this qualitative approach is considered particularly insightful to uncover the 
complex or sensitive issues about staff. According to Webb & Kolodny (2006), “individual party 
employees are often willing to grant interviews and to discuss matters with a striking degree of 
candour, which suggests that qualitative methods may hold the key to unlocking this particular 
research programme” (Webb & Kolodny, 2006, p. 345).  
The first phase of qualitative data-gathering will precede the dissemination of our survey 
questionnaire. By conducting a series of exploratory elite interviews with experienced staffers, two 
purposes will be served. First, these elite interviews will provide us with in-depth information about 
the recruitment, ideological position, expertise and career patterns of staffers. Later on, these 
exploratory data will form the broader frame of reference for the first four papers, guiding us in the 
interpretation of our quantitative observations. Second, our qualitative observations will feed into the 
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construction of the survey questionnaire. In this sense, our first round of exploration will guide 
decisions on how to properly format questions and response categories. The respondents for these 
interviews will be selected among the individuals who have previously held key positions within Belgian 
and Dutch party organizations. In the Belgian case, the sampling of these respondents will be based on 
the annual reports published in Res Publica, as they reported who held those positions until 2007 
(Noppe, 2007). In the Dutch case, we hope to identify a similar publication through which former 
political staffers with extensive experience can be identified.  
The second phase of qualitative data-gathering will take place after the dissemination of our survey 
questionnaire. At this stage, elite interviews will be carried out to gather data for our fifth and final 
paper, which addresses the democratic accountability of staffers. Since our interest is mainly directed 
at the current situation, respondents for this second series of elite interviews will be selected among 
contemporary staffers and elected elites. Our sample will contain three types of actors who are 
involved in the democratic chains of delegation and control: political staffers, staff managers and 
elected elites. Furthermore, these three types of actors will selected from three party branches: the 
central office, the parliamentary party and the party in government.    
4.2. Quantitative data 
As the majority of the papers discussed above are based on quantitative analysis, most data for this 
research project will be gathered by means of an online survey questionnaire among Belgian and Dutch 
political staffers. This questionnaire will contain questions about staffers’ personal characteristics, 
professional experience, political attitudes, education, future ambitions and their interaction with 
colleagues and elected elites. As most papers will investigate differences between staffers, our dataset 
will benefit from a maximum of individual variation. Hence, our survey will not target a sample but the 
whole population of political staffers in the Low countries. By choosing such an approach, we hope to 
attract a sufficient number of respondents with varying types of political tasks belonging to different 
party systems, parties and party branches. To attain this goal, we argue that extra attention should be 
focused on two important issues: getting access to the population and improving response rates.  
The cooperation of parties is of fundamental importance to study political staff. Although party 
organizations have reportedly been wary of this (Webb & Keith, 2017), earlier studies have nonetheless 
succeeded in gaining their cooperation (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003). To gain the trust 
of parties, we aim to undertake three steps. First, we will build on the experience of Karlsen & Saglie 
(2017) by linking the research project to existing research initiatives that are known and trusted by 
parties. More specifically, we will rely on the existing network of the MAPP party member survey to 
get access to contact points within party organizations. Second, these individuals will be contacted for 
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an exploratory interview in which our plans for the dissemination of a survey questionnaire will be 
clarified. Third, parties will receive a tailored research briefing with a party-specific analysis after the 
survey is completed.  
Improving the response rate is another important point of attention. Earlier studies have had varying 
degrees of success on this front, ranging from the relatively low rate of 33% (Webb & Fisher, 2003) to 
more satisfactory rates such as 64% (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017) and 73% of the population (Walgrave et 
al., 2004). Several steps can be undertaken to foster our response rate. First, staff managers (party 
directors, party group secretaries, cabinet chiefs) will be asked for support by sending out a call for 
cooperation to their staffers. Second, we aim to limit the length of the questionnaire as to not deter 
potential respondents from participating. Third, the initial dissemination of the online survey will be 
repeated after a month.   
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5. Time Table 
  2018 
January 
- June 
2018 
August – 
December 
2019 
January 
- June 
2019 
August – 
December 
2020 
January 
- June 
2020 
August – 
December 
2021 
January 
- June 
Qualitative data-gathering (Phase one): Belgium        
Qualitative data-gathering (Phase one): Netherlands        
Quantitative data-gathering: Belgium        
Quantitative data-gathering: Netherlands        
Data-analysis leading to paper 1 – Recruitment         
Writing, presenting and submitting paper 1 – Recruitment        
Data-analysis leading to paper 2 – Party Actors         
Writing, presenting and submitting paper 2 – Party Actors         
Data-analysis leading to paper 3 – Expertise         
Writing, presenting and submitting paper 3 – Expertise         
Data-analysis leading to paper 4 – Ambition         
Writing, presenting and submitting paper 4 – Ambition        
Qualitative data-gathering (Phase two)        
Data-analysis leading to paper 5 -  Accountability         
Writing, presenting and submitting paper 5 -  Accountability         
Compiling theoretical framework, methodological approach and 
empirical papers/articles into one document in order to obtain PhD 
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Appendix 1: Overview of cases 
 Party  Nation Party Family L-R Vote Share Seat Share In Gov Founding Age 
1 N-VA Belgium Conservative 6,5 20,3 22 1 2001 17 
2 PS Belgium Social democracy 2,9 11,7 15,3 0 1885 133 
3 MR Belgium Liberal 6,7 9,6 13,3 1 1846 172 
4 CD&V Belgium Christian democracy 5,8 11,6 12 1 1869 149 
5 VLD Belgium Liberal 7 9,8 9,3 1 1846 172 
6 Sp.a Belgium Social democracy 3,2 8,8 8,7 0 1885 133 
7 CDH Belgium Christian democracy 5,5 5 6 0 1869 149 
8 Groen Belgium Green/Ecologist 2,6 5,3 4 0 1979 39 
9 Ecolo Belgium Green/Ecologist 2,6 3,3 4 0 1976 42 
10 VB Belgium Right-wing 9,7 3,7 2 0 1979 39 
11 PA-PTB Belgium Communist/Socialist 1,2 3,7 1,3 0 1971 47 
12 Défi Belgium Liberal 6,1 1,8 1,3 0 1964 54 
13 VVD Netherlands Liberal 7,3 21,3 22 1 1948 70 
14 PVV Netherlands Conservative 8,8 13,1 13,3 0 2004 14 
15 CDA Netherlands Christian democracy 5,9 12,4 12,7 1 1977 41 
16 D66 Netherlands Liberal 4,5 12,2 12,7 1 1966 52 
17 GL Netherlands Green/Ecologist 2 9,1 9,3 0 1989 29 
18 SP Netherlands Communist/Socialist 1,2 9,1 9,3 0 1971 47 
19 Pvda Netherlands Social democracy 3,6 5,7 6 0 1946 72 
20 CU Netherlands Christian democracy 6,2 3,4 3,3 0 2001 17 
21 PvdD Netherlands Special issue  3,2 3,3 0 2002 16 
22 50+ Netherlands Liberal 6 3,1 2,7 0 2009 9 
23 SGP Netherlands Conservative 8,8 2,1 2 0 1918 100 
24 DENK Netherlands Liberal 6 2,1 2 0 2015 3 
25 FvD Netherlands Conservative 7,4 1,8 1,3 0 2016 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
References 
Allen, P. (2012). Linking Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience and the Career Trajectories of the 
1997 General Election Cohort 1. Parliamentary Affairs, 66(4), 685-707.  
Allen, P., & Cairney, P. (2017). What Do We Mean When We Talk about the ‘Political Class’? Political 
Studies Review, 15(1), 18-27. doi:doi:10.1111/1478-9302.12092 
Andeweg, R. (2000). Fractiocracy? Limits to the ascendancy of the parliamentary party group in 
Dutch politics. Parliamentary party groups in European democracies: political parties behind 
closed doors, 89-105.  
Barber, S. (2014). Arise, careerless politician: The rise of the professional party leader. Politics, 34(1), 
23-31.  
Bardi, L., Calossi, E., & Pizzimenti, E. (2017). Which Face Comes First? The Ascendancy of the Party in 
Public Office. In S. scarrow, P. webb, & T. Poguntke (Eds.), Organizing Political Parties. 
Representation, Participation, and Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blumenthal, S. (1980). The Permanent Campaign: Inside the World of Elite Political Operations: 
Beacon Press (MA). 
Borchert, J. (2003). Professional politicians: Towards a comparative perspective. The political class in 
Advanced Democracies, 1-25.  
Busby, A., & Belkacem, K. (2013). 'Coping with the Information Overload': An Exploration of 
Assistants' Backstage Role in the Everyday Practice of European Parliament Politics.  
Cowley, P. (2012). Arise, novice leader! The continuing rise of the career politician in Britain. Politics, 
32(1), 31-38.  
Dalton, R. J., & Wattenberg, M. P. (2002). Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced 
industrial democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
De Winter, L. (1996). Party encroachment on the executive and legislative branch in the Belgian 
polity. RES PUBLICA, 48(2), 325-352.  
De Winter, L., & Dumont, P. (2006). Do Belgian Parties Undermine the Democratic Chain of 
Delegation? West European Politics, 29(5), 957-976.  
Deschouwer, K. (2012). The politics of Belgium: governing a divided society. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Dickinson, M. J., & Tenpas, K. D. (2002). Explaining Increasing Turnover Rates among Presidential 
Advisers, 1929–1997. Journal of Politics, 64(2), 434-448.  
Dulio, D. A. (2006). Party Crashers? The Relationship Between Political Consultants and Political 
Parties. In R. S. Katz & W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of Party Politics (pp. 348-358). 
Duverger, M. (1964). Les partis politiques. Paris: Colin. 
Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, Å., Trondal, J., & Johannessen, M. (2013). Parliament staff: unpacking the 
behaviour of officials in the European Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(4), 
495-514. doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.718885 
Farrell, D. M., Kolodny, R., & Medvic, S. (2001). Parties and Campaign Professionals in a Digital Age 
Political Consultants in the United States and Their Counterparts Overseas. The Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics, 6(4), 11-30.  
Farrell, D. M., & Webb, P. (2002). Political parties as campaign organizations. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. 
Wattenberg (Eds.), Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies (pp. 102-128). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fisher, J., & Webb, P. (2003). Political Participation: The Vocational Motivations of Labour Party 
Employees. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 5(2), 166-187. 
doi:doi:10.1111/1467-856X.00102 
Holsteyn, J. J. V., Ridder, J. M. D., & Koole, R. A. (2017). From May’s Laws to May’s legacy. Party 
Politics, 23(5), 471-486. doi:10.1177/1354068815603242 
23 
 
Karlsen, R. (2010). Fear of the political consultant. Campaign Professionals and New Technology in 
Norwegian Electoral Politics. Party Politics, 16(2), 193-214. doi:10.1177/1354068809341055 
Karlsen, R., & Saglie, J. (2017). Party bureaucrats, independent professionals, or politicians? A study 
of party employees. West European Politics, 1-21.  
Katz, R., & Mair, P. (1993). The evolution of party organizations in Europe: the three faces of party 
organization. American Review of Politics, 14, 593-617.  
Katz, R., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5-28. doi:Doi 
10.1177/1354068895001001001 
Katz, R., & Mair, P. (2003). The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change 
in Tweentieth-Century Democracies. In R. Gunther, J. Montero, & J. Linz (Eds.), Political 
parties: Old concepts and new challenges (pp. 113-135). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Katz, R., & Mair, P. (2009). The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives on Politics, 7(4), 753-
766. doi:10.1017/S1537592709991782 
Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The transformation of Western European party systems. In J. Lapalombra & 
M. Weiner (Eds.), Political parties and political development (pp. 177-200). New Jersey 
Princeton University Press. 
Kitschelt, H. (1989). The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited. 
Political Studies, 37(3), 400-421. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1989.tb00279.x 
Kölln, A.-K. (2015). The effects of membership decline on party organisations in Europe. European 
Journal of Political Research, 54(4), 707-725. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12110 
Kopecký, P., Mair, P., & Spirova, M. (2012). Party patronage and party government in European 
democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krouwel, A. (2012). Party transformations in European democracies. New York: State University of 
New York Press. 
Lijphart, A. (1968). The politics of accomodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 2.  
Maley, M. (2000). Conceptualising Advisers' Policy Work: The Distinctive Policy Roles of Ministerial 
Advisers in the Keating Government, 1991–96. Australian Journal of Political Science, 35(3), 
449-470. doi:10.1080/713649346 
May, J. D. (1973). Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity. 
Political Studies, 21(2), 135-151. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1973.tb01423.x 
Michels, R. (1915). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern 
democracy. Kitchener: Batoche Books. 
Moens, P., & Smulders, J. (2017). The human capital of political parties. An analysis of extra-
parliamentary party staff in Belgium.  
Monroe, J. (2001). The political party matrix: The persistence of organization. Albany: State University 
of New York Press. 
Müller, W. C. (2006). Party patronage and party colonization of the state. Handbook of party politics, 
189-195.  
Noppe, J. (2007). Morfologie van de Vlaamse politieke partijen in 2005 en 2006. RES PUBLICA, 49(2-
3), 479-544.  
Norris, P. (1995). May's law of curvilinear disparity revisited: leaders, officers, members and voters in 
British political parties. Party Politics, 1(1), 29-47.  
Panebianco, A. (1988). Political parties: organization and power. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Pegan, A. (2017). The role of personal parliamentary assistants in the European Parliament. West 
European Politics, 40(2), 295-315. doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1189138 
Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2004). The politicization of the civil service in comparative perspective: A 
quest for control: Routledge. 
Phillips, A. (1995). The politics of presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. D. (2007). The presidentialization of politics: A comparative study of modern 
democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
24 
 
Romzek, B. S., & Utter, J. A. (1997). Congressional Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerks? 
American Journal of Political Science, 41(4), 1251-1279. doi:10.2307/2960489 
Salisbury, R. H., & Shepsle, K. A. (1981). Congressional staff turnover and the ties-that-bind. American 
Political Science Review, 75(2), 381-396.  
Scammell, M. (1998). The wisdom of the war room: US campaigning and Americanization. Media 
Culture & Society, 20(2), 251-+. doi:Doi 10.1177/016344398020002006 
Scarrow, S. E., Webb, P., & Farrell, D. M. (2000). From social integration to electoral contestation: The 
changing distribution of power within political parties. In R. Dalton & M. Wattenberg (Eds.), 
Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (pp. 129-153). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schlesinger, J. A. (1966). Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States.  
Seyd, P., & Whiteley, P. (2002). New Labour’s grassroots: The transformation of the Labour Party 
membership: Springer. 
Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of 
Political Research, 37(3), 261-289.  
Strøm, K., & Müller, W. C. (2009). Parliamentary democracy, agency problems and party politics. 
Intra-party politics and coalition governments, 25-49.  
Taflaga, M., & Kerby, M. (2017). Mapping the Career Trajectories of Political Staff in Australia 1979-
1999. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Oslo.  
Van Biezen, I., & Kopecký, P. (2014). The cartel party and the state Party–state linkages in European 
democracies. Party Politics, 20(2), 170-182.  
Van Biezen, I., Mair, P., & Poguntke, T. (2012). Going, going, . . . gone? The decline of party 
membership in contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 51(1), 24-56. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01995.x 
Von Beyme, K. (1996). Party leadership and change in party systems: towards a postmodern party 
state? Government and Opposition, 31(2), 135-159.  
Walgrave, S., Caals, T., Suetens, M., & De Swert, K. (2004). Ministerial cabinets and partitocracy: A 
career pattern study of ministerial cabinet members in Belgium: Universiteit Antwerpen 
Politieke Wetenschappen. 
Webb, P., & Fisher, J. (2003). Professionalism and the Millbank tendency: The political sociology of 
New Labour's employees. Politics, 23(1), 10-20.  
Webb, P., & Keith, D. (2017). Assessing the Strength of Party Organizational Resources: A Survey of 
the Evidence from the Political Party Database. In S. Scarrow, P. Webb, & T. Poguntke (Eds.), 
Organizing Political Parties. Representation, Participation, and Power. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Webb, P., & Kolodny, R. (2006). Professional staff in political parties. In R. S. Katz & W. Crotty (Eds.), 
Handbook of Party Politics (pp. 337-347). London: Sage. 
Weber, M. (1921). Politics as a Vocation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press  
 
 
 
